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I want to persuade you that economics gets an unfairly bad press. Eco-
nomics is entering a new golden age, and this book is about the frontiers
of economic research and empirical discovery during the past ﬁfteen or
twenty years. Yet these accomplishments are not widely known.
On the contrary, the subject frequently comes under attack, not just
in academic journals but also in newspapers and political or literary
magazines. Here’s a typical example: “For the economists, money is a
synonym of happiness... It is their philistine notions of personal and
national welfare that have helped to ruin the natural world; confused
technology with culture; reduced art to money, time to interest, sexual
relations to pornography, friendship to advantage, charity to the charity
ball and liberty to shopping.” “Economics,” he splutters, is “unbelievably
crude,” and far inferior to a good novel in diagnosing the ills of society
(Buchan 1995).
At the same time, there is a widespread perception that economists are
extremely powerful. Moisés Naim, the inﬂuential editor of Foreign Pol-
icy magazine, writes: “When economists err in theory, people suﬀer in
practice.” He calls us “a smug lot” and urges more humility on our part.1
It’s widely believed by those who credit us with such power that mem-
bers of the guild of economists run their slide rules over government
proposals on just about anything. People are unsure about what this
involves—I think many believe simultaneously that economics is both
very complicated and just plain common sense—but few would ques-
tion the importance of economic assessments of public policy, and the
role of the profession in government, think tanks, and all the arenas of
public policy debate.
Unfortunately, this inﬂuence is greatly resented by many people who
believethattheeconomist’smentalmodelormethodofanalysisishighly
1In “Economist Class,” Foreign Policy, March/April 2006 (www.foreignpolicy.com/
story/cms.php?story_id=3389, accessed August 15, 2006).
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ﬂawed. While they don’t always make this critique explicit, those trained
in other disciplines believe economics is too narrow in its focus, car-
ing only about money; too dry and robotic in its view of human nature;
too reductionist in its methodology. What’s more, I think there’s also a
widespread fear that the inﬂuence of economics, perceived to be on the
march, has actually been changing the world and is making it more like
the arid, calculating, and uncaring domain of Economic Man.
Let me give an example from my own country, the United Kingdom,
which illustrates these attitudes. During the months I was writing this
book, the British Broadcasting Corporation screened not one but two
whole television series about happiness. Their theme was that the thrust
of all government economic policies aimed at boosting economic growth
was misdirected, because growth doesn’t make us happy. A small ﬂock
of books about happiness settled in the bookstores, and were widely
reviewed in the newspapers and magazines that cover politics and public
policy. The government called in “happiness gurus” to run seminars, and
even appointed a happiness expert to the Bank of England committee
which sets interest rates. It was widely reported that the said guru’s
research concluded that having more sex made us happier than would a
$50,000 pay rise.2 The ﬂurry of favorable comment and policy interest
stemmed, I’m certain, from the belief that the happiness research proves
the economists wrong: economic growth doesn’t make us any happier,
so we can ignore what the economists say about everything!
There’s just one catch: economists have been at the forefront of
the research into well-being, which is the oﬀspring of a fruitful union
between economics and psychology. The number of scholarly articles
in the economics journals with “happiness” or “well-being” in the title
has grown rapidly since the mid 1990s. The most prominent happiness
experts being called in by policy makers are economists. The new ideas
and ﬁndings which have emerged from this overlap between economics
and psychology are discussed in this book, along with their implications
for the whole subject of economics.
Needless to say, I don’t believe this work undermines the foundations
of my subject at all. The popular unpopularity of economics rests on
perceptions which are twenty or thirty years out of date and were always
a bit of a caricature anyway. One of my aims in surveying some of the
most interesting areas of new research since the early 1980s is to try to
bring the perception of what economists do and say up to date.
2This is an average across sexual partners, of course.
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This is a stepping stone to a more ambitious aim, which is to empha-
size to nonspecialists and professional economists alike the importance
of this subject for the caliber of public policy and the future well-being
of our societies. Reading the publications of the policy intelligentsia—
The New Republic or The Nation, opinion columns in The Guardian or
New York Times, Le Figaro or Le Monde—or attending policy seminars
in these countries, or looking at pamphlets issued by many think tanks,
it is clear to me that there has been a kind of romantic backlash against
the rationalist foundations of economics.
We economists must take some of the blame. There are too few good
communicators among us, and we haven’t gone out of our way to explain
the fruitfulness of our approach. I admit that many economists are dull
and speak in jargon. But there’s more to it than our weak PR. This resis-
tance to economics is tied up with the end of the Cold War, the redun-
dancy of the old left–right divisions, and the passing of the Thatcher–
Reagan era, which was widely seen as very much a time of triumph for
economics and markets. The radical conservatives who were in power in
the United States and the United Kingdom during the 1980s drew inspi-
ration and ideas from the strong current in economic research at the
time that emphasized the merits of free markets and the rationality of
people’s expectations and decision making. They were, of course, anti-
communists, and it was the era when Ronald Reagan was able to declare
victory over communism.
Yet it was not the fall of the Berlin Wall that marked the high tide of this
kind of ultra-free-market economics, but rather Reagan’s ﬁrst election
victory in 1981. By the time Hollywood caught up, and had Gordon Gekko
declare (in the 1987 movie Wall Streeet),“Greed is good; greed is right;
greed works,” leading academic economists had already moved very far
from the models of selﬁsh, calculating individuals on which the Gekko
view of the economy was based.
My point is not, therefore, a politically partisan one (my personal poli-
tics are very much of the ﬂattened-in-the-middle-of-the-road kind). I fear
that as long as so many people mistakenly believe economics to be intrin-
sically right wing, we’re in danger of losing the economist’s skeptical,
empirical way of thinking about society. Unless noneconomists appreci-
ate the vital role of the economic way of thought, we will see increasingly
bad, even dangerous, policies.
This is all the more ironic because those scholars working on the
frontiers of economics have ﬁrmly put behind them the inward-looking
reductionism which did indeed sometimes characterize the discipline in
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the past. Economics is enjoying a spectacularly fruitful period, in partic-
ular where it overlaps with other disciplines such as psychology, history,
or anthropology. Economists are oﬀering insights and evidence into the
organization of human society which are both pathbreaking—because
the tools being used were previously unavailable—and controversial—
because there is a growing body of evidence challenging embedded polit-
ical beliefs right across the spectrum. The combination of cheap comput-
ing power, the development of new data sets, and innovations in econo-
metrics and in analytical and computational techniques has had a very
profound inﬂuence on economics, as on other sciences.
This should be of interest to several audiences. Anybody with an inter-
est in politics and public policy should certainly equip themselves with
the insights and results I describe here. I hope general readers of books
on current aﬀairs will enjoy it too. For professional economists who left
the academic world a while ago, this will be a good place to catch up
with developments at the frontiers of research, and I give references to
further material for those who wish to read more. And I particularly
hope researchers in ﬁelds other than economics—not only people in the
other social sciences or natural sciences, but also our harsh critics in the
wider humanities—will be willing to suspend their prejudices about us
and ﬁnd out what we economists are up to these days.
The next eight chapters survey (necessarily brieﬂy) some of the most
exciting areas of recent research. They reﬂect my personal interests—
there are bound to be important gaps. The ﬁrst three chapters (part 1)
address the fundamental question of economic development, the wealth
of nations as our subject’s spiritual elder Adam Smith expressed it. What
is the evidence from the past? What does economic theory tell us about
how to interpret it? How can theory and evidence inform the current
policy debate about reducing global poverty?
Part 2 turns from how economies develop over time to the details
(the “microfoundations”) of how they operate. What valid assumptions
can we make about individual behavior and responses to incentives? Or
about what information people have on which to base their individual
choices? And what is their motivation—what aims drive their behavior
and should be reﬂected in democratic policy decisions? In other words,
do people actually want to get rich or be happy?
The ﬁnal two chapters (part 3) look at how individual economic choices
ﬁt into the world. To what extent and in what ways should economic
decisions be interpreted as part of nature, fundamentally evolutionary
or biological in nature? And how do our choices aggregate to add up
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to a social outcome—how do we interact with each other, and what are
the links between economics and social organization? This brings the
discussion full circle, as social organization is key to questions of eco-
nomic development.
In the conclusion, I return to the point that economists’ way of thinking
is both distinctive and essential for good public policy. I hesitate to use
the word “methodology,” as it’s likely to turn oﬀ those readers who’ve
made it so far, but there is an important point about the methodology
of economics. Part of the critique made of economics by people in other
academic disciplines (but especially the humanities) concerns its suppos-
edly false pretensions to scientiﬁc status. Many critics, including inter-
nal critics, see this as the big mistake made by mainstream economists
in the middle part of the twentieth century: we were trying so hard to
be a proper science, like physics, that we fell into the trap of a sterile,
mechanistic view of human nature and a reductionist vision of society.
The mainstream economics of 1945 onwards is often described as “neo-
classical.” This distinguishes it from the earlier classical economics and
signals greater formalism and use of mathematics, and a codiﬁcation of
the standard assumptions made by all economists in their work. These
include, for example, the assumptions that people make choices ratio-
nally in their own interest, and that aggregate outcomes are the sum of
individual outcomes. The term neoclassical is therefore descriptive, but
it is also often used by critics of economics as a term of abuse. It’s true
that there have been plenty of jobbing economists happy to teach and
apply unrealistic mathematically based models without thinking seri-
ously about their ﬁt with the “real world”; most of the work discussed in
this book has been done by the leading economists, many of them the
winners of the Nobel memorial prize, and by no means all of this mate-
rial has reached current textbooks even at graduate level. I use the term
“neoclassical” as a convenient shorthand for the mainstream approach
of twentieth-century economics. Part of my argument in this book is
that economics has moved decisively beyond the neoclassical assump-
tions in some areas. We use neoclassical models where it makes sense to
do so, for they have proved their worth in many areas, but are no longer
restricted by that framework where the evidence is that the assumptions
are invalid.
Nevertheless, the distinctiveness and importance of economics re-
mains entirely in its insistence on applying the scientiﬁc method to
the study of human behavior. However inadequately we put our behav-
ior under the microscope, it is the only valid mode of analysis. In my
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mind, the most important founding father of economics is the Enlighten-
ment philosopher David Hume, the embodiment of the skeptical method.
Although much less well-known now than his close friend Adam Smith,
Hume is widely regarded as a more important philosopher. He inﬂu-
enced, among many others, James Madison and Alexander Hamilton,
William James, Immanuel Kant, Jeremy Bentham, and Charles Darwin.
Usually labeled an empiricist and a skeptic, Hume’s declared aim was
the introduction of “the experimental method of reasoning into moral
subjects,” the development of a “science of human nature.” In summing
up one of his great works, A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume wrote:
It is at least worthwhile to try whether the science of man will not admit
of the same accuracy which several parts of natural philosophy are
found susceptible of....The sole end of logic is to explain the principle
and operation of our reasoning faculty, and the nature of our ideas;
morals and criticism as regards our tastes and sentiments; and politics
consider[ing] men as united in society and dependent on each other.
He said he wanted to “anatomize human nature in a regular man-
ner” and “draw no conclusions but where he is authorized by experi-
ence.”3 This, not the narrow analysis of making proﬁts in the market-
place, remains the aim of economics. Yet it helps to explain, I think,
the unpopularity of economists. We economists are unwilling to toler-
ate imprecision, wishful thinking, or ﬂattering illusion in the study of
human behavior and society. I hope this won’t deter you from reading
on, though, to learn what huge progress economists have made during
the past two or three decades in the study of humankind.
3Hume’s 1740 abstract, reprinted in On Human Nature and the Understanding (Collier
Books, New York, 1972), pp. 289–90. Hume’s works are available at www.etext.leeds.
ac.uk/hume/.
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